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Plaintiff/Appellant/Counterdefendant Scott M. Brand and Appellant/
Counterdefendant Apr~l G. Brand ("Brands"), by counsel and pursuant to Rule
24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submit the following reply brief in the
above-entitled proceeding.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED THE
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, CONVEYANCES OF THE HEIRS OF MARY JUDGE
ENCOMPASSED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

The brief filed on behalf of Defendant and Appellee The Amy S. Paul Trust
("Paul Brief') argues that the trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law,
that the northern border of the property conveyed by the heirs of Mary Judge to
Francis H. Woodward in 1911, and by Francis H. Woodward to Shaw, Inc. in
1948, encompassed the Subject Property. This must be so, the Paul Trust argues,
in that (1) the heirs of Mary Judge would not have intended to leave a 23-foot strip
of land in their names; (2) Shaw, Inc. held unassailable and marketable title to the
property under Utah's Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-1, et

seq.; (3) the Affidavit of Randall Day did not meet the standards of Rule 5 6( c); and
( 4) the Paul Trust presented facts to the trial court to support its conclusion. These
will be dealt with in turn.

6
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A.

The Trial Court Was Bound by the Terms of the Instruments of
Conveyance, Not What the Paul Trust Deems Logical.
Citing the Court to case law going directly against its position, the Paul

Trust first asserts that the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that the
1911 and 1948 conveyances intended to encompass the Subject Property (whether
or not it lay north of the historic fence line referenced in the governing deeds)
because, in essence, this would have made more sense. This, though, is not the
governing standard:
In an action to construe a deed, the court will "determine the parties'
intent from the plain language of the four corners of the deed." Ault v.
Holden, 2002 UT33, ~ 38, 44 P.3d 781. A court may also look to
extrinsic evidence if the deed is ambiguous.
RHN Corporation v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ,I 40, 96 P.3d 935, 945.

In this matter, the conveyance by the heirs of Mary Judge to Francis H.
Woodward, made on March 13, 1911, made clear the common intent of the
granters: to commence the description of the property conveyed at a point
"beginning 221.3 feet westerly from the section line between Sections 14 and 15,

T2S, RlE, SLB&M, at a point on the fence line dividing the Walker and Judge
Farms ... " (Day Declaration, R.691-741, at Exhibit 9; emphasis added). There is
no ambiguity in the foregoing l_anguage (mirrored in the 1948 Warranty Deed from
Gj

Francis H. Woodward to Shaw, Inc. -Day Declaration, R.691-741, at Exhibit 11):
all parties intended that the property conveyed begin at the designated point along
7
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a fence line between the two farm properties. The boundaries of the property
would then extend south 507 feet, then west 842.1 feet, then south 2113.2 feet to

the southernmost boundary of the property being conveyed. The math is
inescapable: the fence between the farms was located 2,620.2 feet north of the
southern boundary of the property being conveyed, which would later be
Cottonwood Acres No. 2 Subdivision. The ¼ section line, by contrast, was located
23 .1 feet further north of that point. The fence could not have been on the line. In

•

order to honor the intent of the granters, the trial court was tasked with finding a
fence line 507 feet to the north of the second call under both the 1911 and 1948
deeds, and 2,602 feet north of the fourth call - not to stretch that line to the quarter
section line in the interest of tidiness.
Yet by admission of all concerned, both the Paul Trust's expert and the trial
court completely disregarded the mathematical impossibility of their construction
of the two deeds They further dismissed as a matter of law the obvious conclusion
that had the parties intended the section line to be the north boundary, the calls
would have run from that line rather than a fence line; also, the fact that the
interpretation urged by the Paul Trust, and adopted by the court, left the 1948
conveyance to Alexander C. and Agnes 0. Wallace of a parcel on the north of the
Shaw property orphaned in an island rather than flush against the north boundary
thereof; also the fact that the description of Cottonwood Acres No. 1 Subdivision,
8
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recorded in March of 1947, establishes the fence line between the Walker and
Judge farms which, by extension, runs to the south-not the north- of the Subject
Property; and that Shaw, Inc.' s own platting of Cottonwood Acres No. 2
Subdivision in June of 1950 clearly and expressly excludes the Subject Property,
even though courses and distances for the subdivision as shown on the plat map
mirror exactly those in the 1911 deed.
The substance of the matter is obvious, and cuts against the Paul Trust at
every tum. When the Judge Fann was divided by fencing from the Walker Farm, a
~

fence was extended the full width of the quarter section - approximately 2640 feet
from west to east. Yet the fence line was not precisely on the section line, as
property owners on both sides of the fence soon learned. This resulted in the

Ci)

following:

•

Deeds calling to the fence line between the farms, instead of to the
section line;

•

A deed description of the property conveyed to Francis H. Woodward,
and thence to Shaw, Inc., which extended south only 2,620.2 feet to
its southernmost boundary- 23 feet shy of the section line on the
north;

•

A June 6, 1941 Quit Claim Deed to Alexander C. and Agnes 0 .
Wallace setting out a description commencing "at a fence intersection
9

(jjj
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23.8 feet south and 230 feet west of the east quarter comer of section
15, T2S -RlE, Salt Lake Base & Meridian ... " - a point not located

•

on the quarter section line, but 23 .3 feet to the south thereof; and
•

A 1947 subdivision plat to the west of the Subject Property which
established the fence line as running from a point on the west 7 feet
south of the section line, and running S 89°49' E along that fence - a
trajectory which would place the fence line 22-23 feet south of the
section line as it encountered the Subject Property, and within a foot
of the north boundary of the Alexander and Agnes Wallace parcel.

Given all the circumstances, the Paul Trust's argument for a "sensible"
interpretation of the documents of record, in derogation of both the arithmetic of
the descriptions and the surrounding circumstances, simply cannot be
countenanced.

1

1

At page 19 of the Paul Brief, the Paul Trust actually suggests that the fence line
referenced in the 1948 deed to Wallaces was not "the fence line dividing the Walker and
Judge farms" -Paul Brief at p. 19. To suggest that the conveyance to Wallaces was a
property sitting in the middle of a parcel later conveyed to Shaw, Inc., defined by a fence
line 23 feet south of that dividing the fanns - even without the plethora of other
corroborative evidence discussed above - strains logic to the breaking point.

10
1247804.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lil

B.

The Paul Trust's Claims Are Not Rescued by the Marketable
Record Title Act.
On pages 17-18 of the Paul Brief, the Paul Trust attempts to shelter behind

the provisions of the Marketable Record Title Act, suggesting that since the Shaw
deed (recorded February 4, 1949) forms Shaw Corporation's "root of title," that
conveyance must be deemed to include the Subject Property. The Paul Trust made
this argument to the lower court, which did not adopt it. The reason is self-evident.
The purpose of the Marketable Record Title Act is to clear claims against
real property which predate the "root of title." At Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-8(1),
Gi

"marketable record title" is defined to mean "a title of record as indicated in§ 579-1, which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the
(ii)

effective date of the root of title, as are stated in§ 57-9-3." (Emphasis added.) It is
invoked to permit the establishment of ownership in one who "has an unbroken
chain of title of record to any interest in land for 40 years or more ... " - Utah
Code Ann.§ 57-9-1 (emphasis added). Any title established by the Marketable
Record Title Act, however, is subject to "all interests and defects which are
inherent in the muniments of which such chain of record title is formed ..." - Utah
Code Ann.§ 57-9-2(1). The law is well established that the Marketable Record
Title Act does not create title in an individual or entity which holds no such title -

Marchant v. Park City, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990).

11

~
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The Paul Trust's invocation of the Marketable Record Title Act, in short,
presumes the very fact in dispute: that the 1911 deed from the heirs of Mary Judge

~

to Francis H. Woodward, and the 1948 deed from Francis H. Woodward to Shaw,
Inc. included within their description the Subject Property. If the trial court, after
proper consideration of the evidence, concludes that Randy Day was correct, and
that the Subject Property lay north of the fence line forming the northern boundary
of the property conveyed to Francis H. Woodward in 1911, that same exclusion
was mirrored in the 1948 deed which the Paul Trust claims as its "root of title,"
and gives it nothing at all.

C.

Randall Day Was Not a Fact Witness But an Expert Witness, and
His Declaration Was Not Inadmissible.
At page 19 of the Paul Brief, the Paul Trust attempts to invoke Rule 56(c)(4)
Ci

for the proposition that the declarations of Randall Day were inadmissible.
Mr. Day gave expert opinion - not fact testimony - based on years of
experience in the title industry. His declarations (R.691-741 and R.867-876) made
this clear, and the Paul Trust nowhere moved to disqualify him as an expert. The
admissibility of his testimony, therefore, is governed by Rule 703, Utah Rules of
Evidence:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that
the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts
in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or

12
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data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible
for the opinion to be admitted.
Mr. Day's testimony, like that of Mr. Moore, dealt with facts of record with the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, interpreted in accordance with title practices
generally. His resulting opinions are not subject to dismissal under Rule 56( c ).

D.

At the Very Least, the Paul Trust Has Failed to Adduce Sufficient
Facts to Eliminate a Genuine Issue of Triable Fact.
The Paul Brief, at pp. 19-21 thereof, attempts to assemble additional facts to

suggest that Brands' interpretation of the 1911 and 1948 deeds (and the math on
which it is based) are erroneous. These arguments, in light of the undisputed
content of the deeds and instruments addressed in Mr. Day's submittals, only
punctuate the existence of triable issues of fact which should have precluded
summary judgment
The Paul Trust attempts to invoke a March 15, 1911 quit claim deed naming
Mary Agnes Baldwin as grantee, recorded March 15, 1911 as Entry No. 277477,
Book 6-K of Deeds, Page 515, as proof that the north border of the conveyed
property lay on the section line. In fact, the deed does nothing to establish that, as
of that date, the fence line dividing the Judge farm from the Wallace farm was
located on the quarter section line between Section 14 and 15, T2S, RlE, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian. Like the Frances H. Woodward deed of 1911, it begins, not on
~

the quarter section line, but "at a point on the fence line dividing the Judge and
13
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Walker farms, 1348.96 feet more or less westerly from the¼ section comer
between sec.s 14 and 15 ... " Once again, the question becomes the location of the

•

fence at that time; by the express language of the deed, it was not on the quarter
section line, but at a location more or less westerly from the quarter section comer.
Supplemental Day Deel. (R. 868-876) at ,r 3.
Similarly, the Paul Trust presents an un-authenticated period survey, clearly
not drawn to scale, to disprove the actual location of the fence line - disregarding

ct

completely the descriptions in the deeds themselves as discussed above, but the
June 12, 1950 survey of Cottonwood Acres No. 2 (which, unlike the Paul Trust's
offering, was based on an actual survey on the ground, and which reflects the areas
described in the 1911 and 1948 deeds - Day Deel. (R. 691-741) at ,r 7 (k).
Brands acknowledge that facts may be in dispute, but they plainly favor Mr.
Day's reading of the relevant documents and facts. Summary judgment for the
Paul Trust was clearly improper ..

POINT II. THE PAUL TRUST HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY VALID
CONVEYANCE OF SHAW, INC.'S INTEREST.
At pages 22-24 of the Paul Brief, the Paul Trust attempts to bolster its own
lack of credible evidence that it received valid conveyance of Shaw, Inc. 's interest
(if any) in and to the Subject Property in 2015. The Paul Trust claims, first, that
this issue was not properly preserved before the trial court; alternatively, the Paul
Trust attempts to rely on Utah Code Ann.§ 57-4a-4(1) as somehow validating the
14
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conveyances from Wells Fargo and Cynthia Shaw Pitts (R.707-711). Neither is
availing.

A.

The Infirmity of the 2015 Conveyances Was Preserved for the
Trial Court.
The Paul Trust first claims that Brands did not preserve the infirmity of its

claimed sources of title in proceedings before the trial court. The claim is
mystifying.
In response to the Paul Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment, Brands
objected- at some length- to the admissibility of either of the two 2015 quit-claim
deeds, asserting the following:
Brands acknowledge that on June 10, 2015, Rex Wheeler of
Wells Fargo Bank executed a quit claim deed in favor of Paul - Day
Declaration at if 5 and Exhibit 3. Brands object to the efficacy of the
deed to convey all interest of Shaw, Inc. to any property, on the basis
of Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 and Rule 801-802, Utah Rules of
Evidence. The deed itself establishes only that First Interstate Bank of
Utah, N.A. was the personal representative of Manford A. Shaw and
trustee of the Manford A. Shaw Marital Trust and the June W. Shaw
Family Trust, that Shaws were partial shareholders in Shaw, Inc., a
dissolved corporation, prior to their passing, and that Cynthia Shaw
Pitts (a daughter) instructed Wells Fargo to execute the deed, claiming
to have "contacted the other children and heirs of Manford Shaw and
June Shaw" and obtained (apparently verbal) approval from them to
instruct Wells Fargo to execute the deed ...

~

Brands acknowledge that on June 8, 2015, Cynthia Shaw Pitts
executed a quit claim deed in favor of Paul, describing the Subject
Property Paul - Day Declaration at ,I 5 and Exhibit 4. Again, though,
Brands object to the efficacy of the deed to convey all interest of

15
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Shaw, Inc. to any property, on the basis of Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1
and Rule 801-802, Utah Rules of Evidence - the deed claims only that
Ms. Pitts "believes, but does not represent or warrant, that she is the
authorized representative of the other children and heirs of Manford
Shaw and June Shaw, and their respective estates" and that she "has
contacted the other children and heirs of Manford Shaw and June
Shaw, and each of them has agreed and acknowledged that the
undersigned should be authorized to execute and deliver this deed."
She further qualifies the conveyance by stating that she "is informed
and believes, but does not represent or warrant, that at least a majority
of the stock of Shaw, Inc. was and is owned by the heirs and estates of
Manford Shaw and June Shaw."
Brands' Opposition to Amy S. Paul Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 744-763) at pp. 10-11. The issue was raised and addressed again oral argument
on January 26, 2016 (R.1089-1164). There again, the shortcomings of the 2015
quit-claim deeds were addressed to the court-see Brands' opening brief at p. 38
(quoting transcript of the hearing-R. 112-1130).

B.

The Infirmities of the Paul Trust's Conveyances Are Not Cured by
Operation of Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(1).
The Paul Trust next argues at page 24 of the Paul Brief that the

presumptions arising under Section 57-4a-4(1) of the Utah Code somehow cure the
deficiencies in the quit-claim deeds. This is not the case, as none of the
presumptions created by that provision is challenged, but none of them cures the
defects in the Paul Trust's deeds.
Brands do not challenge that the signators to the two quit-claim deeds
executed them voluntarily, that they were who they purported to be (or, in the case
16
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of Mr. Wheeler, that he executed the document on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank),
that the Paul Trust acted in bad faith in receiving the deeds, or that the individuals
acted within the scope of authority represented in the deeds. None of these,
however, address the underlying deficiencies in the instruments. Conveyances
were purportedly based on verbal authority, without warranty of validity or
viability; no instruments complying with the statute of frauds traced the interests
purportedly being conveyed to Shaw, Inc. to Manfred Shaw, June Shaw, Wells
Fargo Bank, or Cynthia Shaw Pitts. With or without the presumptions arising
under Section 57-4a-4(1), the Paul Trust's attempts to claim title based on the quitclaim deeds simply join non-existent dots. As pointed out by both parties before
the lower court, the Paul Trust was required, in order to prevail on its motion, to
demonstrate the soundness of its own title. The proffered deeds fail on their face
to do so.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY WEIGHED
EVIDENCE INCIDENT TO THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The Paul Briefs discussion of the trial court's weighing of evidence during
summary judgme:qt argument is difficult to track. Essentially, the Paul Trust seems
to be arguing that there was no evidence to weigh since all issues were clear as a
matter of law (Paul Brief at pp. 25-27). This only punctuates the clear difference of
opinion between David Moore and Randall Day, which should have been the
17
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substance of disclosure, reports, and cross-examination at trial (see Points I and II,
above). Instead, as the Paul Trust notes in its own brief (Paul Brief at p. 27), the
trial court called the expert witnesses into court, placed them under oath, and itself
conducted examination without affording the attorneys opportunity to crossexamine and present rebuttal. Where - as here - facts and expert opinions are
controverted, cross-examination is clearly warranted. The laws long recognized
cross-examination to be a fundamental right, the deprivation of which (for
example) deprives a criminal defendant of the right of confrontation - State v.

Berretta, 47 UT 479, 155 P. 343 (UT 1916); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (UT
1977); by the same token, deprivation of the right of cross-examination is held to
violate due process in administrative proceedings -D.B. v. Division of

Occupational Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (UT 1989), and in child
custody proceedings (State ex rel G. Y. v. State, 962 P .2d 78 (UT 1998). Clearly, in
this action, if the trial court thought it necessary to compel attendance of expert
witnesses on whose testimony the outcome of the case depended, to place them
under oath and examine them in open court, the matter had proceeded beyond the
point of a summary judgment hearing to the weighing of witnesses' credibility and
reliability- core topics for cross-examination, which Brands were not given the
opportunity to conduct.

18
1247804.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO PERMIT AN AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT.
In response to Brands' claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a motion to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R.943-945),
the Paul Trust does little more than claim that since summary judgment was
properly granted, the refusal to permit the amendment was warranted as the ruling
had in fact mooted all claims. (Astoundingly, the Paul Trust then argues that the
Brands lack standing to be before this Court, as they had "conceded" the basis of
the original Complaint seeking reformation of conveyance from the estate of
John M. Wallace, the very alternative basis upon which Brands sought to amend

and supplement their Complaint. In response to this, see Point VI, below.) The
Paul Trust concedes that Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., calls upon courts to grant leave
to amend "freely... when justice so requires." The Paul Trust further implicitly
concedes that denial of a motion to amend in the absence of prejudice to the
opposing party and without clearly-articulated reasons, is a manifest and per se
abuse of discretion - Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87
P .3d 734. Brands should have been permitted to proceed to trial on alternative
theories, as set out in the proposed amended and supplemental pleading.
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POINT V. THE PAUL TRUST'S REMAINING CLAIM SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
In response to Brands' claim that the dismissal of the Paul Trust's remaining
claims should have been with prejudice, given the tenor of the summary judgment
entered, the Paul Trust inexplicably argues that Brands cannot have it both ways that "the only manner by which the trial court could have granted dismissal of the
un-litigated claims was without prejudice, per Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
41 (a)(2)(ii)." (Paul Brief at p. 29) The Paul Trust does nothing to dispute the fact
that as a matter of logic, the remaining counterclaims cannot co-exist with the
remedy afforded them by the court. By the express language of the court's ruling,
the Paul Trust took title to the Subject Property by virtue of conveyances in June of
2015. Before that time, therefore, the property was owned by the Paul Trust's
supposed predecessor, Shaw, Inc. - ~hich has neither asserted against Brands, nor
assigned to the Paul Trust, any claim for trespass, conversion, etc. Contrary to the
Paul Trust's assertion, it is the position which it adopts in its brief that is
impossible. Any claim by a named plaintiff that his/her/its rights in real property
were .violated before a date certain cannot co-exist with a ruling of a court that
he/she/it did not own the property before that date certain. By inescapable logic,
the dismissal needed to be with prejudice.
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POINT VI. BRANDS HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE THIS APPEAL.
The Paul Trust's final argument (Paul Brief at pp. 30-32) is that by relying
on a conveyance of an heir of Mary Judge (whom its title expert opined held title
to the Subject Property), Brands "changed their theory of the case," and forfeited
standing. This argument was raised on a Motion for Summary Disposition by the
Paul Trust in May of 2016, and rejected by this Court on May 17, 2016. The
reason is self-evident: the Paul Trust's standing argument is essentially an add-on
theory premised on the idea that Brands do not hold an interest in the Subject
Property - the whole substance of the parties' dispute. In essence, the Paul Trust
argues that b_ecause Brands were found not to have title to the Subject Property,
they have no standing to contend otherwise.
Courts have long recognized as a jurisdictional prerequisite that a litigant
have "standing to sue" - some interest or stake in the matter in controversy which
sets the litigant apart from the general public, which constitutes the dispute a
genuine "case and controversy" rather than a petition for an advisory opinion only.
While the prerequisites of "standing to sue" have fluctuated widely over the years,
courts currently recognize broad latitude in affording aggrieved parties access to
courts for resolution of their grievances. "Standing," under Utah jurisprudence, is
thus a subject matter jurisdictional test:
Standing to seek a declaratory judgment requires four elements:
"( 1) there must be a justicible controversy; (2) the interests of the
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parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking judicial relief must have
a legally protectable interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues
between the parties must be ripe for determination."

Kemp v. Wells Fargo BankN.A., 2013 UT App. 88, ~ 5,301 P.3d 23
(quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (UT 1983). In the case of Gregory

v. Shurtliff, 2013 UT 18, 299 P .3d I 098, the Utah Supreme Court quoted favorably
from the decision of Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978), as follows:
We engage in a three-step inquiry in reviewing the question of a
plaintiffs standing to sue. The first step in the inquiry will be
directed to the traditional criteria of the plaintiffs personal stake in
the controversy . . . If the plaintiff does not have standing under the
first step, we will then address the question of whether there is anyone
who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the
plaintiff. If there is no one, and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at
all if the plaintiff is denied standing, this court will grant standing....
The court will deny standing when a plaintiff does not satisfy the first
requirement of the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs with a
more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the
issues. The third step in the analysis is to decide if the issues raised
by the plaintiff are of sufficient public importance in and of
themselves to grant him standing.
2016 UT 18 at~ 13, 299 P.3d at 1103 (emphasis in original).
The Paul Trust attempts to limit the breadth of the standing requirement as
set out in Gregory by citing to Elder v. Nephi City, 2007 UT 46, 164 P. 3d 1238, in
which the court observed that, in a pure quiet title action, "[s]tanding to bring a
quiet title action to perfect title is limited to parties who could acquire an interest
in the property created by the court's judgment or decree" - 2007 UT 46 at ~20
22
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(emphasis added). Since the trial court in this matter ruled that, as a matter of law,
the Paul Trust held record title to the disputed property, and since it likewise cut
off Brands' ability to demonstrate that they are the holders thereof, reasons the
Paul Trust, Brands lack standing under Elder. Other litigants, though, have
attempted to interpret the Elder decision to strip the losing party in a quiet title
dispute of standing to appeal, and the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
argument - see Holladay Towne Center, L.L. C. v. Brown Family Holdings, L.L. C.,
2011 UT 9,248 P. 3d 452 (holding that the Quiet Title Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-1301, et seq. is broad in its reach, and authorizes a determination of "all
rights, interests or claims of the parties." - 2011 UT 9 at~ _54 ). The fact is that had
the trial court denied summary judgment and let the matter proceed to trial, ( 1)
Brands would have succeeded in establishing the right to the disputed property on
one of the pleaded claims, or (2) at the very least, Brands would have succeeded in
obtaining judgment on the merits of the Paul Trust's pleaded claims of trespass,
conversion and damage to property. Standing is not lacking.
A.

By Their Existing Pleadings, Brands Have Standing to Contest
Competing Claims to the Disputed Property.

Brands began this proceeding based on title advice suggesting that title to
the disputed property was included in the Estate of John M. Wall ace, their remote
grantor, and should have been included in their granting deed, but was not. Under
this theory, supported by a title opinion, Brands were entitled to an order reforming
23
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their vesting deed to include the disputed property - see Complaint, R. 1-8. The
Paul Trust, by contrast, initially claimed no interest whatever in the disputed
property arising out of conveyance. Instead, the Paul Trust claimed the right to the
property under possessory theories of boundary by acquiescence, prescriptive
easement, etc. - see R. 29-60.
This, then, was the parties' posture when the case began. To the extent that
(as erroneously maintained by the Paul Trust) standing to sue depends upon "an
interest in property that exists at the time suit is filed" (Paul Trust Motion at p. 6),
the Paul Trust neither had nor asserted the interest on which the trial court
ultimately ruled in its favor. If this were the prerequisite of standing to sue,
therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the basis of the Paul
Trust's standing. As noted above, though, standing has a far broader concept than
this. Both Brands and the Paul Trust asserted competing claims to a disputed
parcel of real property to which neither party held record title at the time of filing.
Brands sought to change this by convincing the court that Brands' vested deed
should be reformed to include the property; the Paul Trust sought to convince the
court that it should grant title to the Paul Trust by reason of usage. Both parties
had standing to pursue their respective theories under both the Elder and the

Shurtliff tests.
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B.

Brands Have Standing to Pursue the Additional Theory of
Interest Under the Heirs of Mary Judge.

As the parties agree, the Paul Trust modified its theory of the case
completely upon obtaining quit-claim deeds from Wells Fargo Bank and Cynthia
Shaw Pitts in June of 2015. The motion for summary judgment- as granted by the
court on no other bases - was that by reason of those deeds, it held valid record
title to the disputed property in that ( 1) as a matter of law, Shaw, Inc. had been
vested with title by a prior conveyance, and (2) again as a matter of law, the quitclaim deeds were somehow effective to transfer the interests of Shaw, Inc. to the
Paul Trust (neither the trial court's Memorandum Decision nor its final Judgment
explained its rationale in this regard - see R. 886-904, 1061-1065). Both of these
propositions were in error, and should have been tested at trial.
Brands were again the parties with standing to contest the Paul Trust's
claim- not only because of their original theory (that the property should have
<i)

been included in their vesting deed from the grantees of the John M. Wallace
Estate), but- according to Metro National Title's opinion - because the property
was in fact vested in the heirs of Mary Judge, a descendant of which had conveyed
his interest to Brands by quit-claim deed dated November 4, 2015 (R. 691-741 at
p. 7 'if 10). For this reason, Brands sought to amend their Complaint, not to
abandon their original theory, but to supplement it with an alternative claim based
on Metro National Title's opinion. In order to perfect this latter claim, however,
25
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Brands needed to trace passage of title through the estates of Mary Judge's heirs to
see if either legal or equitable title had devolved upon their grantor through the
process of descent and distribution.
The court's order of summary judgment, coupled with its denial of Brands'
Motion to Amend on the basis of "mootness," foreclosed this opportunity. The
trial court's Memorandum Decision (R.886-904) made no mention of either party's
standing to assert their respective claims, but concluded only that, as a matter of
law, the northern boundary of the property conveyed to Shaw, Inc. in 1948 was the
quarter section line, thereby encompassing the Subject Property, and concluded
that, therefore, the Paul Trust held title thereto. No mention was made of any lack
of standing by either party. The judgment entered March 2, 2016 (R. l 061-1065),
by the same token, made no mention of standing for the same reason - the parties
competing claims of title were simply not addressed by the trial court.
In short, the parties to this action sought declaration of title to the subject
property. There was a justiciable controversy between them; their interests were
clearly adverse; each party claimed a legally-protectable interest in the
controversy; and the issues were ripe for determination. The Paul Trust's efforts to
re-cast their title arguments as a "standing" infirmity is both belated and
duplicative. The parties clearly had standing to pursue their respective positions
before the trial court. Without making any determination of Brands' title under the
26
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estate of Mary Judge, the court concluded that Shaw, Inc. - not the heirs of Mary
Judge - held legal title to the property. This conclusion was in error. Brands are
better positioned than anyone else to challenge that error, see the court's order of
summary judgment reversed, and remand this matter for trial. If successful there,
Brands will clearly establish an interest in the disputed property. They thus have
standing to pursue this appeal.

C.

Brands Have Standing to Challenge the Trial Court's Dismissal of
the Paul Trust's Counter-Claim without Prejudice.
As a necessary corollary to the foregoing, Brands clearly have standing to

challenge the trial court's decision to dismiss the Paul Trust's claims of trespass,
conversion, damage to property, etc. without prejudice to their reassertion at a later
date. If the trial court's order of summary judgment is permitted to stand as
entered, and Brands are denied the opportunity of challenging its propriety, the
concurrent dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice leaves Brands
<ii

exposed to reassertion of those claims in a subsequent suit-without benefit of the
ability to challenge the legality of the Paul Trust's claim of title to the property
supposedly trespassed upon and damaged. Brands attempted to argue to the trial
court that these claims should be resolved on their merits one way or the other
incident to the Paul Trust's claim of title to the disputed property; the trial court,
however, saw fit to resolve the title claim by summary judgment, and simply
teased out the Paul Trust's claims of unlawful entry only, and damage to, the
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selfsame property for determination in a subsequent action. Brands clearly have a
personal stake in having this Court review the propriety of the trial court's actions
in this regard.
CONCLUSION
The lower court - apparently motivated by an understandable desire to give
finality to a dispute between neighbors without undue delay or expense - rushed to
judgment based upon an incomplete consideration of the issues before it. The
lower court's order of summary judgment should be reversed, and the matter
remanded for trial on the merits.
DATED this 7th day of October 2016.

B
ttomeys or Plaintiff/Appellant
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